Free Will in the Qur’an and Medieval Islamic Thought

A major debate in Medieval Islamic though was the apparent contradiction between human and divine will. In Islam as in all monotheistic faiths, the degree to which individuals are free to make their own choices in the face of an omnipotent god is one that has inspired thinkers to attempt to reconcile the two. The root of the debate lies within the Qur’an itself; it provides a combination of injunctions to goodness, declamations of human powerlessness, and constant reminders of God’s absolute knowledge and authority. For an example of the difficulty of the issue, one may turn to an instance in the Qur’an where all three points are affirmed in succession:

“This is an admonition: Whosoever will, let him take a (straight) Path to his Lord. But ye will not, except as Allah wills: for Allah is full of Knowledge and Wisdom. He will admit to His Mercy whom He will; But the wrongdoers- for them has He prepared a grievous Penalty” – Qur’an 76:29-31

This and similar verses have been interpreted to mean everything from complete predestination to unfettered human free will. Examining some of the arguments of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) and al-Ghazali, both of who take a middle position between the extremes of opinion and address their dissent from other positions, provides a cross-section of arguments within the debate; and demonstrates the authors’ respective identification with Islamic rationalism and mysticism. While these two positions may seem diametrically opposed, Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali often reach surprisingly similar conclusions on the basis of widely divergent arguments.

Making reference to the Qur’an as a third source text and addressing the citations from this book provided by the two authors, I argue that the main concern underlying the debate over free will for both Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali was the issue of whether it is possible for humans to come to a knowledge of God (ma’rifah) either by rational inquiry or by mystic experience. This central question is illustrated in the story of Moses at the Mount, where he asked of God “Show Thyself to me, that I may look upon Thee” (Qur’an 7:143), to which God answers simply “By no means canst thou see Me” (Qur’an 7:143). What God meant by “lan tarānī” is one of the points indirectly addressed by both writers, and which to me seems to be the true source of the debate, rather than whether the “trembling and the movement of his hand” is one’s own choice or divine command.

Ibn Rushd, a consummate rationalist who saw no conflict between philosophy, science, and Islam, begins his analsys of free will in his On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy by recongizing the positions of his contemporaries, from the Mutazilites to the Jabarites. These two camps respectively claim that either all action is free and unconstrained by God and therefore “man’s wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement,” or that “man is compelled to do his deeds” (Ibn Rushd 490). He disagrees with both, on the grounds that the Mutalizite claim implies that there can be another creator (of events, choices) beside God, an impossibility given that “the Muslims are agreed that there is no creator but He [God]” (500). As for the Jabarites, he points out that, without free will, humans are reduced to fulfilling the same role as that of “inorganic matter” (500). Further, were people compelled to action, and subsequently judged for it, “then on him [sic] has been imposed a task which he cannot bear.” The Qur’an clearly opposes this: “On no soul doth Allah place place a burden greater than it can bear” (Qur’an 2:286).

Ibn Rushd quickly reconciles the two opinions, reaching a conclusion closer to that of the Asharites, whose opinion he nonetheless disdains as “quite meaningless” (490). His own stance is that human action itself is freely chosen by individuals, yet the conditions upon which said action is contingent as well as human nature itself is created by God and therefore ultimately subject to the Creator. That is, “the deeds attributed to us are done by our intention,” but this intention is conditioned by “the causes which are called the Predestination of God” (520). Such causes are not merely those external to the self, but also “the causes which God has created in our body” (540). This is what is meant, says Ibn Rushd, by “For each… there are (angels)… before and behind him: They guard him by the command of Allah” (Qur’an 13:11). This is also evident in the verse “But ye shall not will [to go straight] except as Allah wills” (Qur’an 81:29).

Later, Ibn Rushd clarifies that indeed, the question also lies partially in an error of language. While humans may be said to “make” or “create” their choices, this is only the crudest of comparisons with the true act of creation- that of God, who not only is constantly creating, but also constantly preserving creation. To call a person a creator of action is like saying that “the pen share[s] the work of a scribe in writing” (570). The Qur’an makes it clear that there is only one answer to the question of who is the ultimate Actor: “Say: Who is the Lord and Sustainer of the heavens and the earth? Say: (it is) Allah” (Qur’an 13:16).

So, insofar as we have are capable of making our own decisions, we have free will. Yet, because such choices are defined by our circumstances and our nature as created beings, whatever we may do is already recorded in the “Preserved Tablet” (Qur’an 85:22) of creation. I prefer another citation- “of all things have We taken account in the manifest Imam” (Qur’an 36:12), as well as a somewhat modified statement concerning Ibn Rushd’s view, that of Imam Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan III, who said “We live, move, and have our being in God.”

In his autobiography The Rescuer from Error, al-Ghazali dispenses with the specific details of free will as it relates to action, and instead engages in a pedagogic discussion of the capacity for enlightenment. As one of the most renowned Sufi mystics, al-Ghazali rejects the scientific rationalism of Ibn Rushd as dangerous, claiming that even the Muslims from among them must sometimes be “consider[ed]… as blasphemous” (al-Ghazali 98). He instead draws from personal experience to state that, as the Qur’an itself states, “Those whom Allah (in His Plan) willeth to guide- He openeth their breast to Islam” (Qur’an 6:125). To al-Ghazali, this means that only those who have received “Allah’s light” (Qur’an 9:52) can find the ultimate salvation of divine union.

He clarifies that this does not mean that all believers should strive to become mystics, but that “the utmost efforts should be made in seeking [knowledge],” until one finds that they are “seeking what cannot be sought” (88). If one does this, one may be saved, for “whoever seeks what cannot be sought cannot be accused of falling short in seeking what can” (88). To him, this is the proper way of seeking salvation, and all individuals are free to choose to do so. Since Islam states that there is no original sin, al-Ghazali cites the hadith that says “every child is born in the natural state, his parents make him a Jew, Christian, or Magian” (81) to explain that, for the purpose of finding enlightenment, all humans are equally capable- they may each search for God as far as they are able, and on this basis only will they be judged. Because only God is the source of “original nature”, and all unbelief is a subsequent accident of life, a Muslim may trust in God when all other certainty is destroyed.

Al-Ghazali explains his process, similar to that of Descartes and Bishop Berkeley, of slowly questioning all knowledge, beginnning with sensory experience and concluding in doubting the very certaintly of reason itself, which he decided could be superceded by “another judge who… would disprove [reason's] judgement” (85). Laying his trust in God rather than in his own capacity, the debate of free will in al-Ghazali takes on a new dimension- if all created beings have a degree of capacity to become “firmly grounded in understanding… and grasp the Message” (Qur’an 3:7), then their free will is relevant in a secondary position to divine intervention.

One may only prepare to be touched by divine grace, but just as Ibn Rushd says the ultimate Creator is always God, so does al-Ghazali say that only God may decide how close to attainment anyone may reach. What free will does affect is in one’s striving to reach the higher stations (maqamāt al-’aliyyah), and on this, al-Ghazali quotes another hadith- “Your Lord sends breaths [of grace]… put yourselvs in their way” (87). And again, a similar injunction- “And those who strive in Our (Cause)- We will certainly guide them to Our Paths” (Qur’an 29:69).

In describing such grace, the mystic al-Ghazali says “I was not the one who made the move, but rather God moved through me; I did not act, but rather He [sic] acted through me.” Remaining pulcrously orthodox, al-Ghazali refrains from making the same claim of “‘Ana l-Ḥaqq“as the martyr al-Ḥallāj, yet he is clearly describing the state of fanā’ fī-llāh where one’s will is extinguished in the divine Will, the personal self disappears, every debate is resolve, and all questions are answered as easily as Khidr says to Moses “Such is the interpretation of (those things) over which thou was unable to hold patience” (Qur’an 18:82).